A Dangerous Balancing Act: Why the UK’s Somaliland Policy Undermines Somali Sovereignty and Pan-African Principles

In the Horn of Africa, sovereignty is not an abstract concept, it is a hard-won legacy shaped by colonial partition, liberation struggles, and decades of resistance to fragmentation. Against this backdrop, the United Kingdom’s policy toward Somalia and Somaliland represents a troubling contradiction that risks undermining not only Somalia’s unity but also the broader Pan-African principle of territorial integrity.

S🇴 Sovereignty Is Not Selective

Officially, the UK claims to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It does not recognize Somaliland, the region in northwestern Somalia that unilaterally declared independence in 1991. This position aligns with the African Union, the United Nations, and international law, all of which reject unilateral secession as a destabilizing precedent in post-colonial Africa.

For Africa, this principle is sacred. It was adopted precisely to prevent powerful external actors from rewarding fragmentation, exploiting internal weaknesses, and redrawing borders for strategic convenience. Somalia, like many African states, inherited borders drawn by colonial powers, not by its people, and protecting those borders remains central to continental stability.

Berbera: When Economics Trump Principle

Yet the UK’s actions contradict its stated commitments.

Through British International Investment (BII), a UK government-owned institution, Britain is a minority investor in the Berbera Port, partnering with DP World and the Somaliland authorities. This is not a neutral or technical transaction. It is a political act, one that confers legitimacy, economic power, and international credibility on a secessionist administration without the consent of the Federal Government of Somalia.

From a sovereignty-first perspective, this is deeply problematic.
You cannot claim to support Somalia’s unity while simultaneously bypassing Mogadishu, negotiating with de-facto authorities, and embedding foreign capital into contested territory.

This approach mirrors a long and painful African experience: foreign powers preaching stability and unity while quietly cutting deals where it suits their interests.

Strategic Geography, Familiar Patterns

Justification is always the same strategy.

Berbera sits along one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. It offers access to global shipping lanes and serves as a potential trade outlet for landlocked Ethiopia. In an era of Red Sea militarization, Sudanese collapse, and great-power competition, Berbera is undeniably attractive.

But Africa has seen this story before.

Strategic ports, trade corridors, and security access have repeatedly been used to justify selective interpretations of sovereignty—where African unity is upheld in speeches but diluted in practice. When commercial interests and geopolitical calculations take priority, African states are left managing the long-term political fallout.

Why This Matters Beyond Somalia

This is not just a Somali issue—it is a Pan-African concern.

If Somaliland is economically empowered, diplomatically normalized, and treated as a quasi-state without formal recognition, the message to the continent is clear:
Secession may not be recognized on paper, but it can still be rewarded in practice.

That precedent threatens fragile states across Africa, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. It weakens African-led solutions and emboldens external actors to pick winners and losers based on stability, convenience, and return on investment.

A Call for Principle Over Pragmatism

A sovereignty-first, Pan-African approach demands consistency:

  • Respect Somalia’s territorial integrity in both word and action
  • Engage the Federal Government of Somalia on all strategic infrastructure projects
  • Avoid economic arrangements that legitimize secessionist administrations
  • Support African Union-led dialogue, not parallel tracks driven by foreign capital

Africa does not reject investment. Somalia does not reject development. What is rejected—rightly—is a model where economic pragmatism quietly erodes political sovereignty.

If the UK truly wishes to be a partner in stability, peace, and development in the Horn of Africa, it must choose clarity over contradiction—and principle over convenience.

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